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Modelling is an important component of contingency planning and control of disease outbreaks. 
Dynamic network models are considered more useful than static models because they capture 
important dynamic patterns of farm behaviour as evidenced through animal movements. This study 
evaluates the usefulness of a dynamic network model of swine fever to predict pre-detection spread 
via movements of pigs, when there may be considerable uncertainty surrounding the time of incursion 
of infection. It explores the utility and limitations of animal movement data to inform such models 
and as such, provides some insight into the impact of improving traceability through real-time animal 
movement reporting and the use of electronic animal movement databases. The study concludes that 
the type of premises and uncertainty of the time of disease incursion will affect model accuracy and 
highlights the need for improvements in these areas.
The epidemics of bovine spongiform encephalopathy in Europe1 and of foot-and-mouth disease in the UK2 
showed the importance of using mathematical models of disease transmission in providing key information to 
design contingency planning for animal disease outbreaks. By providing epidemiological insight that can be 
considered alongside the complex interactions between social, economic and welfare outcomes of disease incur-
sions and control strategies, models have helped to inform decisions on disease control2–5, and can also be used 
judiciously as tools to improve communication with non-expert stakeholders6. Models must be based on robust 
data and assumptions to usefully inform policies and add value to field-based control activities. However, disease 
control decisions during epidemic responses are made in the context of wide range of uncertainties. Improving 
our understanding of the impact of these uncertainties on infectious disease models outcomes is therefore a way 
to improve their capabilities to efficiently inform policy.
Network models, which were once confined to physics and social science problems7, have proliferated in 
the field of human8–10 and animal4,5,11,12 health and are increasingly used to inform disease control strategies as 
part of national contingency plans. When applied to animal diseases, these models consider farms as nodes of a 
network that are linked by the transfer or movement of (potentially infected) animals. Animal movements are 
increasingly recorded in national databases, informing on the daily number of animals moved between all farms 
present in an industry. This large volume of data enables models to appropriately capture the dynamic changes in 
the contact structure between farms, and therefore enables them to directly adjust for the underlying farm-level 
economic and behavioural variations when moving animals. As such, predictions from dynamic networks models 
are potentially more accurate than those from models considering the animal movement network as static13,14.
1Centre for Immunity, Infection and Evolution, University of Edinburgh, King’s Buildings, Edinburgh, UK. 2School 
of Veterinary Medicine, Boyd Orr Centre for Population and Ecosystem Health, College of Medical, Veterinary and 
Life Sciences, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK. 3Epidemiology Research Unit, SRUC, Drummondhill, Stratherrick 
Road, Inverness, UK. Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to T.P. (email: t.porphyre@
ed.ac.uk)
Received: 09 April 2015
Accepted: 30 December 2015
Published: 01 February 2016
OPEN
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
2Scientific RepoRts | 6:20258 | DOI: 10.1038/srep20258
As movement of animals within the livestock industry carries the risk of transmitting infectious diseases 
across substantial geographical distances, dynamic network models have been increasingly used prior to disease 
outbreaks to improve preparedness. Particularly, dynamic network models have been used to assess the potential 
for pre-detection spread of infection via movements of animals5,11, identify regional and local movement pat-
terns4,11, and provide guidance for the design of efficient control and surveillance strategies4,12. However, their 
use may go further, notably by estimating the extent of the disease spread that has already occurred when disease 
incursions have been detected and restrictions on animal movements are implemented15. By quickly and accu-
rately estimating the spatial extent of the pre-detection spread via movements of animals, they potentially offer 
additional tools to support field-based contact tracing, and increase the efficiency of disease control responses. 
However, little work has been done to exploit dynamic network models to such effect.
The emphasis on using dynamic network models for contingency planning, but not during an outbreak, may 
be due to an assumption that they are less useful for making predictions of disease spread or identifying high risk 
farms in scenarios in which disease incursion has already occurred6,16. This assumption may be based on two 
prior beliefs: (i) that data quality may be compromised by time-lags in data recording; and (ii) that the date of 
infection, which is critical to appropriate data selection, may be difficult to ascertain with any certainty. Time-lags 
in data recording would mean that models have to rely on historical data. However, this problem has been min-
imised by the advent of electronic databases which mean farmers may directly report movements ahead of time. 
As a result, live animal movements, such as for sheep and pigs, are now available in real-time in Scotland (through 
the Scottish livestock electronic identification and traceability database ScotEID, https://www.scoteid.com/) to 
inform epidemiological modelling to predict the dissemination of a pathogen throughout the livestock industry 
in a timeframe relevant to disease control activities.
Establishing an accurate date of infection is crucial for identifying which data should be included in the model. 
This can be difficult, as it depends on factors such as clinical presentation and the success of field-based contact 
tracing procedures, both of which can vary widely. The impact of this uncertainty around date of infection may 
depend on the temporal dynamism in the pattern of animal movements between farms, and differences in farm 
trading behaviour, in a given livestock industry. This may affect model predictions (and the uncertainty around 
them) of the patterns of disease spread.
The objective of this study is to assess the usefulness of dynamic network models for predicting the spa-
tial extent of the pre-detection spread via movements of animals, when there may be considerable uncertainty 
surrounding the time of incursion of infection. In order to achieve this objective, we have focused on diseases 
of pigs (e.g. swine fevers such as classical swine fever (CSF) or African swine fever (ASF) viruses) which have 
non-specific clinical signs as well as a high potential to be transmitted through animal movements17,18. These 
characteristics provide a useful model scenario because of the challenging nature of disease detection and the 
increased potential for silent spread within the pig population. We then explored the usefulness and limitations 
of using pig movement data (using ScotEID as an exemplar) to inform models when attempting to respond 
to an infectious disease incursion. Thus the results of this study should also provide insight into the impact of 
improving traceability through real-time animal movement reporting and the use of electronic animal movement 
databases.
Results
Impact of uncertainty in infection time. We looked at the extent to which inaccuracy in defining the 
disease incursion date may impact on the accuracy of predictions of pre-detection spread of acute swine diseases 
via movements of pigs. A premises-based model was developed to simulate their spread through the Scottish 
swine industry via movements of pigs, in which gathering places (such as markets, and collection centres) were 
explicitly modelled together with pig producers. In the first instance, we considered the extreme case where 
infection occurs if at least 1 animal from an infected premises is received by a susceptible one. In this situation, 
the “infection paths” Γt,i of farms that were infected via movements of animals from a single pig producer i was 
computed for each Monday of the year 2012. Here, we considered all ith producers that were active during the 
period [t0, t0+ T] eligible to be an index-case, where t0 is the incursion date and T is the “pre-detection period” 
(that is, the period between the date of the incursion t0 and the date of the first detection of the disease). We then 
compared the infection paths Γt,i with those Γt+δ,i generated when time of infection t0 is inaccurately estimated by 
an error δ ranging from − 7δ0 to 7δ0. In this study, infection path Γt,i refers to the “correct” full epidemic tree that 
is generated by a single infection event at time t0 and left freely spreading for the pre-detection period [t0, t0+ T], 
while Γt+δ,i refers to the “predicted” full epidemic tree when the incursion date is inaccurately estimated and for 
which the pre-detection period is [t0+ δ, t0+ T–δ]. We considered, δ0 = 7 days and T = 60 days19.
In Fig. 1, we show how increasing uncertainty around the time of incursion may affect one’s ability to accu-
rately predict not only the number of premises involved in the full epidemic tree but also their identity. Overall, 
progressively increasing the error δ around the time of the incursion from δ0 to 7δ0 yielded a marked reduction in 
the correlation between sizes (i.e., the number of premises involved in) of infection paths Γt,i and Γt+δ,i (Fig. 1a,b). 
Although this reduction was consistent across paths of all sizes (Fig. 1a), it was more pronounced for paths of 
larger sizes (Fig. 1b). Also, there was a clear divide between infection paths generated from commercial pro-
ducers and those generated from non-commercial producers (Fig. 1c). Despite a wide uncertainty on the time 
of the incursion, the correlation remained high between infection paths generated by commercial producers 
(Spearman’s correlation coefficient ρ > 0.60), whether assured or non-assured, for errors ranging from − 7δ0 to 
4δ0. In contrast, correlation between infection paths becomes weaker for incursions in non-commercial produc-
ers, with ρ < 0.60 for errors of ± 3δ0.
In order to see if we could accurately predict which individual premises would be involved in epidemics 
despite some inaccuracy in the incursion time, we compared the concordance between infection paths Γt,i and 
Γt+δ,i generated from the same index-case i, by calculating the Jaccard similarity index J(Γt,i,Γt+δ,i). The Jaccard 
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index measures the fraction of common premises within paths |ξt,i ∪ ξt+δ,i| among the total number of premises 
|ξt,i ∩ ξt+δ,i| involved in both paths. Here, we only focused on infection paths involving more than 10 infected 
premises.
Progressively increasing the error around the infection time up to 7δ0 revealed a reduction in the median 
degree of overlap between paths (Fig. 1d). The rate of this reduction differed, however, whether the incursion 
time is believed earlier (i.e. δ < 0) or later (i.e. δ > 0) than the true one. Overall, an error of − 4δ0 in the infection 
time yielded 77% (95% CI 0.76–0.79) overlaps between the true and predicted paths, whereas an error of > 2δ0 is 
enough to create completely different paths with paths involving, on average, less than half of common premises.
Unsurprisingly, variations between producer types were observed in the degree of overlap between Γt,i and 
Γt+δ,i. While the degree of overlap between predicted and the true paths generated by commercial producers 
followed closely the general trend, it differs greatly when considering paths generated by non-commercial small 
producers. This was expected, because most paths of > 10 infected premises have been generated by commercial 
producers. However, differences between the degree of overlap for paths generated by commercial and those by 
non-commercial producers depends on the direction of the error δ: when δ < 0, predicted paths generated by 
non-commercial producers have a greater number of common premises with the true path, whereas paths would 
show a completely different pattern (i.e. J(Γt,i,Γt+δ,i) < 10%) from > 4δ0 (Fig. 1d). These results suggest that if 
incursion occurs in non-commercial producers, conservative estimates in incursion times would be preferential. 
However, this may not be true for incursion occurring in commercial producers as a trade-off may exist between 
optimising the proportion of premises that are truly on the infection path (true positives) and minimising the 
proportion of premises that are not (false positives). Figure 2 explores how these two epidemiological measures 
vary with δ for paths generated by the different producer types. Over-estimating incursion times for outbreaks 
generated from commercial producers (whether assured or not), would increase the risk of misclassification. 
Figure 1. Comparison between the correct infection path and predicted paths generated when the error 
δ in the time of the incursion ranges from −7δ0 to 7δ0. (a) Lines plot showing the smoothed size of the 
predicted full epidemic tree Γt+δ,i as a function of the size of the correct full epidemic tree Γt,i. (b) Changes in 
the Spearman correlation coefficient between the size of Γt,i and that of Γt+δ,i as a function of the error δ in the 
time of the incursion. Correlation coefficients are computed either upon all generated infection paths or upon 
infection paths of > 10 infected premises. (c) Changes in the Spearman correlation coefficient between the size 
of Γt,i and that of Γt+δ,i as a function of δ and stratified by the producer type of the index-case. (d) Quality of 
infection path prediction, as measured by the median Jaccard similarity index, as a function of δ and stratified 
by the producer type of the index-case. Shaded areas around each line shown in (a–d) represent their respective 
confidence interval. Here, δ0 = 7days. Diagonal solid line in (a) indicates perfect concordance between the 
true and predicted length of infection paths. The vertical solid line in (b–d) indicates the time of the correct 
incursion time.
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For example, inferences generated for outbreaks from non-assured and from assured commercial producers 
when δ  = −5δ0 would involve 24% (95% CI 22–29%) and 39% (95% CI 37–41%) of false positives, respectively 
(Fig. 2b).
So far in this analysis, the potential for spread of infection via movements of animals has been evaluated 
considering that any movement from infected premises during the pre-detection period would result in disease 
transmission to susceptible farms. In reality, the prevalence of disease within infected premises will determine 
what proportion β of its livestock becomes infectious. This, together with the number of animals that are being 
moved off, will determine what proportion of movements will contain infectious animals. To gain general insight 
and ensure robustness of the results to variation in β, 10,000 simulations for each Monday of the year 2012 with 
a random index-case per simulation were carried (i.e., total of 570,000 simulations). For each incursion date t0, 
the infection paths Γ’t,i of farms that were infected via animal movements from a single pig producer i was then 
computed and compared to the infection paths Γ’t+δ,i that were predicted when an error δ around the time of the 
incursion is made. As above, Γ’t,i and Γ’t+δ,i are the “correct” and “predicted” partial epidemic tree, respectively, 
and correspond to all farms that have a non-null probability of being infected via animal movements from a 
single pig producer i. Figure 3 shows that, whether comparison is made with the “correct” full epidemic tree Γt,i 
(i.e. when β = 1) or with the “correct” partial epidemic tree Γ’t,i (i.e. when β < 1), qualitatively similar results as in 
Fig. 1 are obtained. However, it further appears that decreasing the value of β would reduce the effect of δ when 
predicting the size of the infection path (Fig. 3a). It is to note, however, that this result may give a false sense of 
security as the degree of overlaps between correct and predicted paths still sharply decreases with increasing error 
δ around the time of the incursion from δ0 to 7δ0 (Fig. 3b).
Intrinsic structure of infection paths. Although our findings suggest that inferring the spread of an epi-
demic from dynamic network models is precarious when the date of the disease incursion is unknown, infection 
paths may have some intrinsic structure which may still guide contact tracing procedures. Previously, such a 
structure was found in the Italian cattle industry by comparing epidemic trees and regrouping index-cases which 
generated similar trees, thereby providing critical information to optimize surveillance systems and define rapid 
containment strategies4. Applying a similar method for the Scottish swine industry, however, would only result 
in regrouping producers that belong to the same business or are part of the same breeding pyramid. Instead, we 
looked at the producer type of both the index case and all farms that have been infected via the movement of ani-
mals when considering β = 1, and determined, for all full epidemic tree Γt,i that gave rise to at least 10 cases from 
the year 2012, the proportion of producers of each type that were involved in each infection path. The results are 
summarized in Fig. 4.
If disease incursion occurs in the herd of a small producer, the mean risk of disease spillover into assured pro-
ducers is low (0.011); and similar to the mean risk of disease spillover from assured producers to small producers 
(0.032). Epidemics which start in a small producer spread into at least one assured producer in only 1.9% of the 
incursions. However, once an assured producer is infected, 60% (Q1–Q3: 17–71%) of the premises in the gener-
ated infection paths would belong to assured producers. In contrast, epidemics generated from assured producers 
would spread into small producers in 39% of the incursions, but would not involve many of them, with only 8% 
(Q1–Q3: 2–27%) of premises in these infection paths belonging to small producers. These findings are the conse-
quence of producers adhering to quality assurance scheme guidelines on risks associated with animal trading20, 
confirming that excluding interactions with producers that have lower biosecurity standards is a good biosecurity 
Figure 2. Proportions of true (a) and false (b) positives between the correct full infection path and predicted 
paths generated when the error δ in the time of the incursion ranges from − 7δ0 to 7δ0. Here, δ0 = 7days. 
Points/lines represent the observed median proportions, stratified as a function of the producer type of the 
index-case, whereas shaded areas represent their respective 95% confidence interval. Only infection paths of > 10 
infected premises are used. The vertical solid line indicates the time of the correct incursion time. The proportion 
of true positives measures the fraction of common premises within paths |ξt,i ∪ ξt+δ,i| among the number of 
premises |ξt,i| that are on the correct path. The proportion of false positives measures the fraction of uncommon 
premises within paths 1 − |ξt,i ∪ ξt+δ,i| among the number of premises |ξt+δ,i| that are on the wrong path.
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practice21. Such a result may constitute a basis for the development of qualitative rules modulating surveillance 
activities in the face of an epidemic.
Non-assured commercial producers appear to have a totally different epidemiological profile (Fig. 4). 
Non-assured commercial producers have a consistently high probability (> 95%) of being on an infection path 
and make up, on average, 17% (Q1–Q3: 9–22%) of premise in these paths, regardless of the producer type of the 
incursion. In addition, epidemics generated by non-assured producers show a high likelihood of infecting both 
small producers (0.62) and assured producers (0.85). This result highlights that Scottish swine producers who are 
commercially driven but do not belong to assurance schemes may potentially represent “epidemiological” bridges 
between non-commercial and commercial partners, likely because they implement lower biosecurity, particularly 
with regard to sourcing and sending pigs, compared to assured commercial producers. Therefore, improving bios-
ecurity and targeting surveillance to non-assured producers may be particularly beneficial to optimise responses 
to disease incursions.
Discussion
In order to improve preparedness for disease incursion, it is critical to have some understanding of model resil-
iency to uncertainties which fundamentally underlie the stochastic nature of disease control activities. In this 
study, we evaluated the resilience of dynamic network models in predicting disease spread after disease incursion, 
when there may be considerable uncertainty surrounding the timing of infection. A model which predicts the 
spread of swine fevers was chosen as an exemplar because of the characteristics of the disease and its param-
eterisation using pig movement data from an electronic database. This has particular relevance and potential 
policy impact because ASF virus has recently spread within the eastern European region22 and the middle east23, 
and now poses an imminent threat to the European swine industry24,25. Although there are measures in place to 
reduce the risk of introduction of disease, such as restrictions on the movement of live pigs and animal products 
Figure 3. Comparison between the correct infection path and paths generated when the error δ in the 
time of the incursion ranges from −7δ0 to 7δ0 and when imperfect transmission occurs. (a) Changes in 
the Spearman correlation coefficient between the size of the correct infection path and paths generated when 
both the error δ in the time of the incursion and the transmission probability β vary. Quality of infection 
path prediction, as measured by the median Jaccard similarity index (b), proportion of true (c) positives and 
proportion of false positives (d) between the correct infection path and paths generated when both δ and β 
vary. Solid and dotted lines indicate how measures may change when comparing predicted partial infection 
path Γ’t+δ,i to either the correct partial epidemic tree Γ’t,i generated with δ = 0 and β < 1 (solid) or the correct 
full epidemic tree Γt,i generated with δ = 0 and β = 1 (dotted). Shaded areas around each line shown in (b–d) 
represent the confidence interval around the median. Here, δ0 = 7days. The vertical solid line in (a–d) indicates 
the time of the correct incursion time.
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in affected areas, and regulations on animal swill feeding (which has been banned in the European Union since 
2002), further incursions and spread of these diseases throughout Europe are considered likely24,26,27.
Our analysis not only confirmed that increasing the uncertainty around the incursion date significantly 
reduced the ability of dynamic network models to predict epidemic characteristics, such as epidemic size, or 
specific premises that become infected, but also quantified the magnitude of the loss of accuracy of predictions. 
For example, erroneously estimating the time of incursion more than three weeks earlier appears to generate a low 
accuracy of predicting cases (i.e. less than 60%, Fig. 1d), which would miss between 30% to 50% of the potentially 
infected farms (Fig. 2a). Although such a measurement bias may potentially generate longer and more severe 
epidemics, it may be preferable to the alternative misclassification error. A prediction that a farm is potentially 
infected, when it is not likely to be because of the true absence of contact with an at-risk farm, may have unin-
tended negative consequences for resource allocation (of veterinarians which may be needed more urgently else-
where) and farmer welfare and behaviour (in response to the fear for potential loss of livestock and livelihood).
The type of premises where the incursion occurs can drastically impact on the scale of both of these biases and, 
therefore, on the resilience of predictions to temporal uncertainties. In the Scottish swine industry, the predict-
ability of the number of premises infected via animal movement (Fig. 1c) and of specific premises that become 
infected (Fig. 1d) differ whether epidemics are generated by commercial or non-commercial producers. While 
our results indicate that all inferences produced from dynamic network models clearly suffer when the time of 
infection is estimated earlier (Figs 1d and 2), more conservative estimates of time of infection appear only pref-
erable when incursion occurs in small producers. In this situation, widening the time window considered for the 
incursion would ensure that the incursion is included while not losing performance. Although this may be coun-
terintuitive, it could be explained by the frequency of movements occurring from small producers. It has been 
previously shown that the rate of movement from and to small producers in Scotland is four to ten times lower 
than commercially-driven producers20, with an average of a movement every 29 weeks. It is therefore likely that 
increasing the time window for the incursion would include most of the movements that may be infectious while 
avoiding the inclusion of a large number of farms that are not infected. These results suggest that widening the 
time window considered for the incursion would provide a cost-efficient strategy when responding to incursion 
of infectious diseases in small producers, avoiding wasting resources that would be required to establish a precise 
incursion date.
In the model, we have first assumed that the trade of at least one animal between infected and susceptible 
premises was sufficient to allow infection to occur. It is obvious that this assumption may overestimate the extent 
of disease spread via movements of pigs (although bearing in mind that this model did not consider the potential 
for spread by other routes), as the infection process between farms is stochastic and depends on the within-farm 
prevalence as well as the virulence of the relevant outbreak strain. However, these assumptions seem appropriate 
because they not only increase the ease of the comparison between epidemic trees, but also enable (1) robust 
estimates of the potential geographical extent of disease spread that is consistent with contact tracing procedures 
and (2) communication of the general implication of temporal uncertainties in model inferences to policy makers 
(and model users in general). Nevertheless, varying the probability of transmission did not change the qualitative 
outcome of our analysis (Fig. 3).
Figure 4. Proportion of non-assured commercial, assured commercial and small non-commercial 
producers involved in infection paths of >10 infected premises generated by each producer type. Here, 
columns indicate the producer type of the index-case, whereas rows indicate the type of the producers that are 
involved in each infection path. The thickness of the shapes is proportional to the density of data points along 
the x-axis.
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It is clear from this study that on detection of an incursion, effort should be focused on obtaining an accu-
rate incursion date. Improved accuracy of this estimate will improve the validity of epidemiological outputs 
from dynamic network models at early stages of an epidemic, and therefore will optimise the identification of 
the sources of infection and any presumed susceptible in-contact animals. However, quick detection of disease 
incursions is also critical. While the role of small producers in the spread of swine diseases has been previ-
ously shown28,29, routine surveillance activities (i.e. surveillance conducted not during an outbreak) mostly 
target assured commercial producers (for example abattoir inspection, veterinary/health scheme monitoring). 
Superficially, this risk-based surveillance strategy is reasonable because of the important influence of commer-
cial producers on the sustainability of pig products (and the pig industry) and thus, food security30. However, 
Fig. 4 suggests that exclusively targeting assured commercial producers during routine surveillance activities will 
likely miss incursion events in backyard producers. Simulation studies looking at the spread of CSF in Bulgaria, 
where small producers are believed to play a role in the persistence of the disease31, have shown that infections 
from small producers to assured producers were rare32. Although consistent with our findings (Fig. 4), our 
results also indicated that non-assured commercial producers may constitute a bridge of infection between the 
non-commercial and commercial sectors of the swine industry in Scotland. With regards to improving surveil-
lance for incursions of emerging swine diseases in Scotland, non-assured commercial producers may represent a 
sentinel population which would allow the detection of incursions in the non-commercial sector of the industry.
In this study, we assessed the usefulness of national electronic animal movement databases as a tool for 
traceability by examining the degree to which uncertainty around incursion time may affect predictions on the 
pre-detection spread of emerging swine diseases such as CSF and ASF in Scotland. Our results on movement pat-
terns of swine in Scotland are also important for other exotic diseases of swine (e.g. foot-and-mouth disease) and 
may have relevance for other swine industries. Although the pig industry in Scotland is small, commercial pro-
duction is well organised and focuses on assured production of high quality farrow-to-finish pigs. The pig indus-
try in Scotland also shows a relative high diversity of producer types, with a large proportion of non-commercial 
pig holdings20. The Scottish swine industry may then represent a good example for similar industries, where 
non-commercial pig farming has an important place.
In Scotland, movements of swine shows a lack of seasonality20, similar to what has been reported in other 
countries12,33. It may therefore be possible to extrapolate these results to other similarly structured pig popula-
tions. In contrast, more work is required to determine whether these findings are applicable to other livestock 
sectors. The magnitude and directionality of movements of cattle and sheep in Scotland are highly seasonal. As 
such, these patterns will likely have an impact on the probability of epidemic take off5,11, and therefore are also 
likely to affect the predictability of the network structure in these sectors.
In conclusion, the type of premises and the uncertainty of the time of disease incursion will affect dynamic 
network model accuracy and thus, usefulness. Cursorily, it may appear that if the incursion time is uncertain, 
using conservative estimates of incursion time (i.e. covering a wider time window) would increase the probability 
of detecting all potentially infected farms. However, this approach also generates a larger number of premises 
that would require field-based investigation (of which a higher proportion would be negative), which would be 
challenging when resources are limited. Resources may be better placed trying to more accurately determine the 
incursion time, since dynamic network models can make valuable predictions to help with disease control and 
resource allocation if the incursion time is known. In such situation, efforts in improving surveillance prior to 
disease incursion are critical to optimise responses to disease incursions.
Methods
Data. All movement data were extracted from the Scottish livestock electronic identification and traceability 
database (ScotEID) which came into use in November 2011. We refer to20 for further details on the data collec-
tion, process and quality as well as some preliminary descriptive analyses.
Briefly, under Scottish (SSI 2011/351) and European legislation (Commission Decision 2000/678/EC), all pig 
keepers moving animals are required to register online with ScotEID and electronically record any movements 
ahead of time. To avoid selection bias due to inevitable missing or non-reported movements in the early stages 
of implementation of the database, we restricted our analysis to all movements recorded from January 1st 2012 
to May 31st 2013. We used January 1st 2012 for the start of the study period, on the basis that (1) it corresponds 
to the time when the previous movement database (the Scottish Animal Movement System, SAMS) recording 
Scottish animal movements ended (i.e. November 2011), and (2) there has been a stabilisation of the movement 
pattern since December 2011.
The database provides a comprehensive picture of all movements of pigs in Scotland at the batch level. As such, 
each movement record reports the County Parish Holding (CPH) identifier and postcode for departures and des-
tinations, the number of animals involved, and the date of the movements. Details of premises type for departures 
and destinations are recorded in the movement database, allowing slaughterhouses, markets, show-grounds and 
ferry collection centres to be differentiated from agricultural holdings. Note that all markets recorded in ScotEID 
operate as auctioneers holding dedicated sales/collections of pigs for onward consignment to a slaughterhouse, 
also named “red markets”. Collections of animals that are destined to be slaughtered are therefore regularly car-
ried out in these markets, but remain separated from the other activities of such premises, particularly activities 
dedicated to sales of pigs between producers.
Pig producer types. Through the CPH identifier, the ScotEID movement database was linked to the 2011 
Scottish Agricultural Census, and to the 2010 GB Agricultural Census, to obtain information on the total number 
of pigs and sows present on farm. We further link the data to the 2013 Quality Meat Scotland (QMS) register (for 
Scottish premises) and to the 2013 Red Tractor register (for non-Scottish premises) to identify if producers were 
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members of a health quality assurance scheme. Pig producers were then classified according to their pig popula-
tion size, movement activity and the health quality assurance scheme membership20:
1. “Small pig producers”: agricultural holdings with an unknown number of pigs; or less than five sows, and/
or less than 10 finishers; and showing no records of movements of more than 50 pigs within the study 
period.
2. “Non-assured commercial producers”: agricultural holdings with more than five sows and/or more than 
10 finishers; or showing records of movements of more than 50 pigs during the study period, but do not 
belong to a quality health assurance scheme from QMS or Red Tractor, the main British assurance schemes.
3. “Assured commercial producers”: agricultural holdings with more than five sows and/or more than 10 
finishers; or showing records of movements with more than 50 pigs during the study period but also belong 
to a quality health assurance scheme from QMS and/or Red Tractor.
Infection path. The spread of disease within the Scottish swine industry was modelled using a simple sto-
chastic discrete-time SI model. Our model treated each premises involved in the movement of Scottish pigs as a 
single unit. In this model, all premises are susceptible (S) to the infection at the start of the epidemics, except for 
a single premises, chosen at random, that would initially be at the infected, and infectious, state (I). During the 
course of an epidemic, disease passes from infected premises i to susceptible ones j via movements of pigs with a 
probability Mij,t such as β= − ( − ), ,M 1 1ij t
N ij t, where β is the probability that a single pig from i may carry the 
disease and potentially transmit it to j (somewhat corresponding to the within-herd prevalence), Nij,t the number 
of pigs that moved from i to j per time-step t and with movements of pigs synchronously updated at each 
time-step. Although other transmission routes have also been implicated in the spread of swine fevers (such as 
spread via fomites, wild boar, semen or pig products), only infection through live pig movements was considered 
as it the most common transmission route17,18. Here, the model is seeded at incursion time t0, progresses in dis-
crete time steps t of one day, and runs for a fixed period T.
In addition to swine producers, gathering places (e.g. markets, show grounds, and ferry collection centres) 
were considered in the spread of diseases. Regulations are in place in Scotland, as in most EU countries, to 
ensure that the spread of pathogens via movements of animals through gathering places is limited. Gathering 
places should not keep pigs overnight and have cleaning and disinfection implemented after each day of activity 
(Council Directive 97/12/EC). As such, the model considers that all infected gathering places would go back to 
the susceptible state after one day (thereby following a SIS process), whereas infected swine producers would 
remain infected for the remaining of the simulation period T. As a consequence, epidemics were considered start-
ing by a swine producer only. The model was used only to look at the spread of disease before detection. Therefore 
the control measures that would be initiated on identification of the disease (such as culling of pigs on infected 
premises, movement restrictions) were not included in the model.
To ensure that only the heterogeneity and the structure of the dynamic network formed by the movements of 
pigs were driving the modelled epidemics, all swine producers involved in the movements of pigs were consid-
ered identical, such that their producer type or herd size would not have any effect on the transmission dynamics. 
Unless otherwise stated, we considered the extreme case where infection occurs if at least one animal from an 
infected premises is received by a susceptible one, i.e. when β = 1. It is obvious that, given such a model structure, 
the characteristics of simulated epidemics would be overestimated and would not reflect the intrinsic potential 
of disease spread in the Scottish swine industry. However, such a model provides information on the maximum 
infection tree generated by each index-case via movements of animals, which not only provides an estimate of 
the maximum epidemic size generated by the movement of animals for the considered T, but also identifies all 
premises that are likely to be infected. Furthermore, such a model structure provides an estimate of infection trees 
for each incursion location that is easily comparable between time periods.
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